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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HYDE T. CLAYTON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CI'TY, SALT 
LAKE, COUNTY, 
J. BRACKEN LEE, L. C. 
ROMNEY, CONRAD 
HARRISON, HERBERT F. 
SMART, JOE L. 
CHRISTENSEN, C. W. 
BRADY, MARVIN JENSON, 
and EDWIN Q. CANNON, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 9903 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The above en ti tied case is appealed to this 
Court from a Judgment of the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The 
case was filed in the Third District Court by a tax-
payer against Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, and 
the individual defendants as elected offici~als of Salt 
Lake City and Salt Lake County. 
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The action was initiated by the taxpayer to 
enjoin or prohibit Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County 
'and the elected officials from proceeding with a 
contract alleged by the petitioner to be in excess of 
or in abuse of their discretion. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
On April 8, 1963, the Honorable A. H. Ellett, 
one of the judges of the Third District Court, after 
hearing argument, granted a Motion on behalf of 
all of the defendants for a Summary Judgment. 
The judge's Order gr1anted the Motion and dismissed 
the Petition with prejudice. It is from this Order 
of the District Court that appeal is taken to the 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The purpose of this appeal is to reverse the 
Judgment awarded in the District Court granting 
Summary Judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's Peti-
tion and sending this case back to the District Court 
for a trial upon the issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The action initiat€d in the Third District Court 
resulted from a proposed plan jointly by Salt Lake 
City and Salt Lake County to build a new metro-
politan Hall of Justice in Salt Lake City (R. 2). 
For the purpose of effecting the construction of 
a metropolitan Hall of Justice, Salt Lake City and 
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Salt Lake County opevated jointly through their 
officers and commissioners as a joint authority (R. 
2) . In pursuance of the plan to build a metropolitan 
Hall of Justice specifications for jail equipment 
wPt'P published by and on behalf of the joint author-
ity on or about October 30, 1962. (R. 2). 
The cost of construction of the proposed metro-
politan Hall of Justice was estimated by the joint 
City and County authority to be in the approximate 
sum of $800,000.00 (R. 2). 
As a result of the publication of "specifications 
for jail equipment" and an advertisement for bids, 
bids were received. Among these bids was one re-
ceived from Southern Steel Company and another 
by Herrick Iron Works ( R. 3). Other bids were 
received and all were opened on or about November 
28, 1962. The bid of Herrick Iron Works was the 
sum of $542,42'5.00 and the bid of Southern Steel 
Company was in excess of 597,000.00. The bid of 
Herrick Iron Works was more than $55,000.00 low-
er than the bid of Southern Steel. The bids of the 
other companies participating were higher than 
eithel'. (R. 3). On or about January 7, 1963, 
the joint authority of Salt Lake City and Salt 
Lake County accepted the bid of the Southern 
Steel Company and rejected the lower bid of 
Herrick Iron Works (R. 3). 
The petitioner, a resident of Salt Lake City, 
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Salt Lake County, brought the action which results 
in this Appeal on behalf of himself and others simi-
Larly situated and on behalf of such other taxpayers 
as might wish to join in the petition. (R. 2). 
The petitioner requested the District Court to 
make an Order requiring the individual defendants 
to appear and show cause why they should not be 
prohibited from proceeding in accordance with the 
contract entered into by them acting for the joint 
authority. The Petition further requested that they 
be required to show cause why they should not be 
prohibited from disbursing or dispensing public 
funds in connection with said contract pending a 
hearing 1and trial of the issues raised by the Petition 
in their District Court. The Petition also requested 
that upon a trial of the issues the Court make an 
Order permanently prohibiting 1and restraining the 
defendants and each of them from proceeding with 
the contract into which they had entered with South-
ern Steel. (R. 5). 
Based upon the verified Petition, the District 
Court ordered the defendants' named to show cause 
why they should not be prohibited during the pen-
dency of the action from pursuing the contract into 
which they had entered with the Southern Steel 
Company. 
When the matter came on for hearing, the 
Court entered an Order enjoining the defendants 
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from pursuing the con tract until the trial of the 
action. It was further ordered that the petitioner 
post a $1,000.00. 
The trial court next considered the matter upon 
the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
entered the Order granting that Motion to dismiss 
the Petition April 8, 1963. (R. 46). 
STATEMENT OF POINT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION OF THE DEFENDANTS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE RE'CORD BEFORE HIM 
CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THERE WERE MANY 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT UNRESOLV-
ED AND WHICH NECE8SITATED A TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
MOTIDN OF THE DEFENDANTS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE RE·CORD BEFORE HIM 
CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THERE WERE MANY 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT UNRESOLV-
ED AND WHICH NECESSITATED A TRIAL. 
Identical Motions for Summary Judgment were 
filed on behalf of Salt Lake City and the Salt Lake 
City Commissioners and on behalf of Salt Lake 
County and the Salt Lake County Commissioners. 
(R. 24-27). These Motions were based upon Affi-
davits filed on behalf of the moving parties of Roy 
W. McLeese, Salt Lake City Engineer, and Harold 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
K. Beecher, the archi teet for the public safety and 
jail building. These Affidavits are found in the 
Record - Mr. McLeese's, R. 16-2'3, inclusive, and 
Mr. Beecher, R. 7-14, inclusive. 
'These MfidJavits were traversed by an Affi-
davit made by Conrad R. Mader, Security Equip-
ment Sales Engineer for the Herrick Iron Works. 
His affidavit is found in the Record, R-38-44, in-
clusive. It is scarcely necessary to refer to the pro-
visions of Rule 56 (c) relating to the basis upon 
which summary judgment may be granted. 
The important portions of the rule upon which 
these motions were based reads as follows: 
'~The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions and ad-
missions on file, give herewith the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact, and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." 
Decisions construing this portion of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the comparable Federal 
Rule are legion. The general tenor of these deci-
sions is that summary judgment is a harsh and 
stringent remedy and is not to be granted unless 
it clearly 1appears that there are no genuine issues 
of material fact which require resolution and that 
the rna tter can be disposed of simply as a question 
of law. 
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Conversely stated, if from the records and 
documents before the Court, it appears that there 
are gneuine issues of fact that require trial, sum-
mary judgment is not a proper remedy. 
A representative statement of the principle for 
which the appellant contends and upon which the 
appellant relies is found in the opinion of Judge 
Hutcheson of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in lrhitaker vs. Coleroon, 115 F. 2d 305: 
" ... The invoked procedure, valuable as it is 
for striking through sham claims and de-
fenses which stand in the way of a direct ap-
proach to the truth of a case, was not intend-
ed to, it cannot deprive a litigant of, or at 
all encroach upon, his right to a jury trial. 
" ... To proceed to summary judgment it is 
not sufficient then that the judge may not 
credit testimony proffered or a tendered is-
sue. It must appear that there is no substan-
tial evidence on it, that is, either that the 
tendered evidence is in its nature too incred-
ible to b eaccepted by reasonable minds, or 
that conceding its truth, it is without legal 
probative force . . . 
" ... Summary judgment procedure is not a 
catch penny contrivance to take unwary liti-
gants into its toils ~and deprive them of a trial, 
it is a liberal measure, liberally designed for 
arriving at the truth. Its purpose is not to cut 
litigants off from their right of trial by jury 
if they really have evidence which they will 
offer on a trial, it is to carefully test this 
out, in advance of tri1al by inquiring and de-
termining whether such evidence exists." 
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A further annunciation of the principle that 
the appellant believes applicable is found in the 
opinion of Judge Riddick speaking for the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Walling vs. Fair_mont 
Cremery Comp1any, 139 F. 2d 3'18: 
On a motion for a summary judgment the 
burden of establishing the nonexistence of 
any genuine issue of fact is upon the moving 
party, all doubts are resolved against him, 
and his supporting affidavidts ~and deposi-
tions, if any, are carefully scrutinized by the 
court ... On appeal from an order granting 
a defendant's motion for summary judgment 
the circuit court of appeals must give the 
plaintiff the benefit of every doubt." 
Another statement of the principle particularly 
applicable to the situation presented by this appeal 
is found in Sprague vs. Vogt, 150 F. 2d 79'5, 801, in 
which Judge Woodrough of the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals says the following: 
"That one reasonably may surmise that the 
plain tiff is unlikely to prevail upon a tri,al, is 
not a sufficient basis for refusing him his 
day in court with respect to issues which are 
not shown to be sham, frivolous, or so unsub-
stantial that it would obviously be futile to 
try them." 
Upon many occasions this Court has announced 
the same views 1as those expressed by the various 
Federal Circuits in construing and applying the 
comparable positions of the Federal Rules. Repre-
sentative among these case is In Re Willinms Estate, 
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348 P. 2d 683. This was an action by the petitioner, 
Gladys Wil!ilams, against the administrator of the 
Estate of the decedent to be included as an heir at 
law. The petitioners contention was based upon a 
claimed agreement by the decedent and the plain-
tiff's natural mother to 1adopt her. No Decree of 
Adoption was ever secured and the question was 
whether the purported agreement to adopt should 
be effective to permit the petitioner to participate 
as an heir at law. 
The trial court granted a motion for sum-
mary judgment against the petitioner and in favor 
of the administrator of the estate. It was reviewed 
by this Court and its decision reversed the trial 
court upon the theory that if the proof which the 
plaintiff could produce in the light most favor-
able to her could justify a finding of an agreement 
to adopt, then she should have an opportunity to 
present the proof and summ1ary judgment was an 
improper remedy. 
Similarly in Brandt vs. Springville Banking 
Company, 353 P. 2d 460, 10 Utah 2d 350, this court 
said the following: 
vVe are cognizant of the desireability of per-
mitting litigants to fully present their case 
to the court and summary judgment prevents 
this. For that reason courts are, and should be, 
reluctant to invoke this remedy.'' 
In Bullock vs. Deseret Dodge and Truck Center, 
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356 P. 2d 559, this Court expressed the principle 
involved as follows: 
"A summary judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admissions and inferences which 
when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the loser shows that there is no genuine issue 
as to ~any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Such showing must preclude all reason-
able possibility that the looser could, if given 
a trial, produce evidence which would reason-
ably sustain a judgment in his favor." 
Tanner vs. Utah Poultry and Farmers Cooper-
ative, 359 P. 2d 18, was an action against the Co-
operative for the proceeds of marketing trukey 
crops. A defense was asserted on the basis of a 
purported release of any claim by the plaintiff 
against the Cooperative. A Motion for Summary 
Judgment in favor of the defendant and against the 
plaintiff was granted and the trial judge was re-
versed by this Court. The case held that an issue 
of fact arose as a result of the pleadings and the 
contentions of the parties which necessitated a trial. 
The Court said, among other things: 
"A summary judgment is appropri!ate only 
where the favored party makes a showing 
which precludes as a matter of law the award-
ing of any relief to the losing party." 
The problem presented by this appeal, as in 
most appeals, is not a delieniation of the principle 
which is controlling, but the application of the prin-
10 
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ciple or principles to the facts presented by the re-
cord which is before the Court. 
As previously stated, the Motions of the de-
fendants were based upon the affidavits of Roy W. 
McLeese and Harold K. Beecher. These were tvav-
ersed in detail by an affidavit filed 'by Mr. Conrad 
Mader on behalf of the petitioner. 
It is the position of the appellant that these 
affidavits clearly point out differences of opinion 
as to factual matters which are material to the de-
termination of the lawsuit. 
The following portion of the argument is a 
reference paragraph by paragraph to these affi-
davits demonstrating the factual issues which re-
mained unresolved when the matter was argued be-
fore the trial court and which the appellant feels 
necessitated a trial. 
The affidavit of Mr. Beecher and Mr. McLeese 
are identical therefore, the affidavit of Mr. Mader 
in contr-avention will be compared with that of Mr. 
Beecher. 
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Beecher's affidavit (R. 
8) say in effect that the specifications called for 
both electrical and mechanical remote fully selec-
tive movement control. These pavagraphs say that. 
the bid of HeiTick Iron Works was a permitted 
alternate but did not comply with the specifications. 
11 
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Paragraph 3 of Mader's affidavit states that the 
Herrick Iron Works did comply with the speci-
fications 1and included an additional amount of 
$4,150.00 for the furnishing of emergency power. 
Paragraph 12 of Beecher's affidavit states in 
effect that the system proposed by the Herrick Com-
pany could be bid only as an alternate. (R. 9). 
Paragraph 7 of Mader's affidavit (R. 40) 
states that the full automatic selective system pro-
posed by Herrick was acceptable pursuant to Para-
graph 24-A of the specifications and was not an 
alternate proposal. 
Paragraph 17 of Beecher's affidavit says that 
Drawing 71-A of the Herrick plans does not pro-
vide the type of construction specified (R. 10). 
Paragraph 8 of Mader's affidavit (R. 40) says 
that 71-A clearly shows the type of door construction 
and is in conformance with Section 23 of the in-
structions to jail equipment bidders. 
Pargarphs 20 and 2'1 of Beecher's affidavit (R. 
11) claim that the Herrick bid did not set up the 
length of horizon tal cover boxes. 
Paragrtaph 10 of Mader's affidavit (R. 41) 
says that the Herrick bid sets out the specifications, 
the approximate width of cells from six feet to 
twenty-four feet and that the model was demon-
strated with the covering boxes proposed. 
12 
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Beecher's affidavit says in substance in Bara-
graphs 22 and 23 (R. 11-12) that the Herrick bid 
sets up a conflict and produces ambiguity as to the 
power requirement for the operation of independent 
sliding doors. 
Mader's affidavit in Paragraph 11 (R. 41) 
states that this specification submitted by the Her-
rick Iron Company clearly shows the power source 
for independent sliding doors. 
Beecher's affidavit in Paragraph 25 (R. 12) 
says that the d~awing submitted 'by the Herrick 
Iron Works as it relates to "Sally Port Doors" does 
not conform to specifications. 
Paragraph 12 of Mader's affidavit says in ef-
fect that the dvawing submitted the Herrick Iron 
'Vorks does conform to the requirements of the 
specifications. (R. 41) 
Paragraph 26 of Beecher's affidavit ( R. 12-
13) says in effect that Drawing 71-A by Herrick 
does not provide the thickness, sizes and type of 
material for door jamb components. 
Baragraph 13 of Mader's affivadit (R. 42) 
says the Drawing 71-A by Herrick Iron Works 
clearly shows the thickness, sizes and types of the 
door jam components. 
Paragraph 27 of Beecher's affidavit (R. 13) 
states that Paragrnph 23 of the Instructions to Bid-
13 
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ders require submission in duplicate of substitute 
specifications. 
Paragraph 14 of Mader's affidavit (R. 42) 
states that the Iron Works did furnish the necessary 
alternate specifications and drawings in duplicate. 
Paragraphs 29 and 30 of Beecher's affidavit 
( R. 13) state that aluminum cover, instead of steel, 
was provided on the model submitted by Herrick 
Iron Works, and, therefore, did not satisfy the re-
quirement based upon the specifications. 
Paragraph 15 of Mader's affidavit (R. 4'2-43) 
says that the model conformed to the specifications 
and that the aluminum cover was pointed out to 
those persons who examined it and that no objec-
tion was made and that no rejection of the bid was 
contemplated upon that basis. 
Paragraphs 31 1and 32 of Beecher's affidavit 
(R. 1'3-14) say that there was an ambiguity of 
quality of materials to be installed in the final Her-
rick Iron Company product. 
Paragraph 17 of Mader's affidavit (R. 4'3-44) 
says that there was no ambiguity in the material 
proposed to be submitted by the Herrick Iron Works 
and that the model was the same as that proposed 
to be supplied by the Herrick Iron Works. 
Paragraph 34 of Beecher's affidavit (R. 14) 
says that the instructions to jail equipment bidders 
did not permit any erasures or modifications. This 
14 
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presumably implied the proposal of Herrick Iron 
Works did have erasures or modifications. 
Paragraph 18 of Mader's affidavit (R. 44) 
states that the proposal of the Herrick Iron Works 
did not contain 1any erasers nor did the proposal re-
quire any modification subsequent to the opening of 
bids to "clearly describe the substitute functions 
and equipment". 
What has been presented is a summary or a 
resume of these matters contained in these conflict-
ing affidavits which in view of the 1appellant clearly 
shows in the evidence which would be presented at a 
trial disagreement relating to material matters of 
fact. 
An application of the principal regarding pro-
priety of granting summary judgment based upon 
the record before this court demonstrates that the 
judgment of the trial court based upon the motions 
was improperly gran ted; and should require a tri1al 
upon the issues. 
Oral argument in the submissions for sum-
mary judgment was extensive. It is unfortunate that 
a complete stenographic record of the statements 
of counsel and the colloquy between court 1and coun-
sel is not available. 
At the request of the appellant, the reporter 
was present during a portion of the argument for 
the purpose of making a specific record relating to 
15 
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the disposition of the motions for summary judg. 
ment on the basis of the written record before the 
court l"ather than the statements of counsel. In this 
connection the court's attention is invited to the 
stenographic record made during a part of the argu-
ment (R. 149-152). It appeared to the writer that 
the court, during the progress of the argument, be-
came concerned with some matters which the writer 
believed to be evidentuary rather than directly re-
lated to those documents which were properly be-
fore the court. Although there is but a fragmentary 
record of a proceeding had upon argument, counsel 
for the appellant makes the following representa-
tions to this Court with respect to that 1argument 
and the comments of the trial judge. 
During the argument, the learned trial judge 
seemed to be concerned with respect to the utility 
and quality of one inch steel bars as distinguished 
from 7 /8th inch steel bars. The specifications and 
the bids submitted indicate, 'and the record is be-
fore this Court, that Southern Steel Company in-
tended to employ one inch steel bars and Herrick 
Iron Works 7 /8th inch steel bars. 
As the trial judge evidenced some concern with 
respect to this difference and indicated that this 
might have some bearing on his ruling on the Mo-
tions then before him, his attention was invited to 
testimony of one of the members of the joint 1author-
16 
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ity, C. W. Brady, which appeared in his deposition. 
Thi~ deposition is designated as a portion of the 
rrcord on appeal. The following portion of his depo-
~ition, under cross-examination by Mr. Crellin, rep-
resenting Salt Lake City, is set forth verbatum 
(R. 137-138) : 
"Q. Do you believe that the one inch steel 
proposed by Southern Steel in their bidlactu-
ally involves a superior type of equipment to 
the seven eighths type steel proposed by Her-
rick Iron Works? Doesn't this in fact pro-
vide a more substantial system? 
"A. No, in my belief it does not. There you 
have it right there. (witness indicates) That 
is how interested I was. This is a piece of one 
inch. This is a piece of seven eighths. Now if 
you can see any great deal of difference in 
that piece of steel at the bottom and the piece 
of steel at the top. My main interest on this 
was the fact that the seven eighths piece of 
steel passed identically the same test as the 
one inch test 1and I maintained that we should 
go not on the size of the bar but the fact of 
what that bar would withstand. Now if this 
is true, then they could bid a piece of inch 
and a half if this would be any stronger but 
that seven eighths piece of steel would stand 
the same test as the one inch. As a matter of 
fact I think the seven eighths gives you great-
er visibility between them bars. I don't think 
this piece of steel (witness indicates) offers 
one bit more protection than this steel right 
there. 
"Q. does it cost more? 
"A. The one inch, yes, because you are pay-
17 
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ing for weight and it is bound to cost you 
more. 
"Q. And the system is actually going to cost 
more, isn't it, one inch steel in this jail flaci-
lity is going to cost considerably more because 
of that one inch steel regardless of anything 
else? 
"A. That is one of my arguments. Why 
should we be paying more for weight when 
we don't need it, that is one of my argu-
ments." 
Shortly before the trial judge announced his 
decision for summary judgment, he made a state-
ment in substance and effect as follows: 
"Jesus Christ in all His glory could never 
convince me that 7 /8ths inch steel bars are 
as good as one inch steel bars." 
The writer is sure that even counsel for the respon-
dents will recall this statement. 
Since no findings of fact or conclusions of law 
were prepared, and were not required to be made 
by the trial judge in granting the Motions, it is 
difficult to determine from the record we have, 
upon what basis he made his decision to grant the 
Motions for Summary Judgment. 
It is, however, the view of the appellant that 
the record clearly indicates disputed matters of 
fact, which require trial and that there is at least 
a possibility that some matters which would be the 
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subject of the submission of evidence upon the trial 
of the matter were taken in to account by the trial 
judge in making his ruling on these Motions. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted, that, for the reas-
ons asserted above the ruling of the trial judge in 
granting the Motions of the defendants 1and respon-
dents for Summary Judgment and dismissing the 
plaintiff's petition should be reversed and that this 
case should be remanded to the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for ~a 
trial upon its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR. 
Attorney for Appellant 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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